In this paper we consider two-person games in strategic form in cases in which each player has only two moves. The related Nash competitive and cooperative solution and Nash equilibria are presented. Nash cooperative solution is the only solution such that the corresponding payoffs respect three properties (belonging to feasible set, Pareto optimality and symmetry) together with two technical axioms of independence from irrelevant alternatives and from linear transformations. In addition to the existence and uniqueness of this solution that has been proved for many cases [5, 11, 24] in this paper we also prove for the first time that if the convexity of the set X is necessary and sufficient condition also the condition that the Pareto optimal boundary of the convex hull of the individually rational feasible set coincides with the Pareto optimal boundary of X is necessary and sufficient condition i.e. X is convex. This finding implies that if the Pareto optimal boundary of the convex hull of the feasible set coincides with the Pareto optimal boundary of the last set, then the solution is unique; elsewhere the solution does not exist.
Introduction
The Game Theory in strategic or normal form is the theory of the mathematical models of strategic interactions. The applications of these models are many: from the economic field to the military discipline, as well as biological, social, medical, psychological, financial, political, environmental, sport areas, etc. The first theoretical model of cooperative game was introduced by J. von Neumann and O. Morgenstern [23] . They started from the idea that the players in a coalition put together their gains, and therefore, the main objective of a coalition is to maximize the total utility of its member. The core of a cooperative game, which indicates that the payoff vectors cannot be blocked by any coalition, has been studied intensively in the literature [5, 6, 19, 20, 21] . The core is nonempty for a large class of games, but on the other hand many interesting conflict situations are naturally formulated as cooperative games for which the core is empty. The question therefore arises whether there exists a meaningful solution concept for such games which captures important aspects of the core, so that it may be considered an extension of the core to a more general class of games.
Ultimately it involves a solution concept to describe, predict or prescribe the choices of these players [1] . Modern game theory [10, 14, 15] is predominantly noncooperative and assumes that any joint rational actions by the players must be a Nash equilibrium (NE) [1, 18] . In other words, rational players act in their individual self-interest. Each player's action maximizes his payoff for the actions of the other players. The result is that no player can improve his expected payoff by unilaterally changing his strategy. Various refinements of the NE [2, 4, 12, 14, 15] have been proposed, yet players can often do better by cooperating. Social dilemmas such as the Prisioner's Dilemma, Snow drift, and Ultimatum games [3, 7, 25] illustrate that selfish behaviour may conflict with group interests. We will deal with games of the first form, limitedly to the case of two players each having only two moves.
One can refer to [20] for a more general report and to [8] for an historical overview.
Our two person games
In order to introduce our problem we start with three examples that will follow us in the whole paper.
Game 1.
Players A and B must choose whether to intervene or not in a certain circumstance. The relevant utilities are as follows.
-If a player doesn't intervene and the other one intervenes, the first wins nothing and the other wins 1; -if any one intervenes, both win 0; -if both intervene, A wins 1/3 and B wins 1/6. This example is represented by the bi-matrix in Table 1 , where the possible actions (or moves) of A are A1 = non intervention and A2 = intervention; the possible moves of B are B1 = non intervention and B2 = intervention. In the intersection between every couple of moves of the two players, the first number expresses the win of A and the second number the win of B. A pure strategy of a player is the choice of one among his possible moves. A mixed strategy of a player is a probability distribution on the set of his pure strategies. Then, for every mixed strategy α = (α1, α2) of the first player and for every mixed strategy β = (β1, β2) of the second player must be:
For simplicity of language, the pure strategies are sometimes identified with the corresponding moves. This is the case. For instance, in game 1, the strategy α1 = 0, α2 = 1, β 1 = 1, β 2 = 0 means that the first player uses move A2 (i.e. he intervenes) and the second one uses move B1 (i.e. he doesn't intervene). He achieves to winning (or payoff) 1 for the first player, and 0 for the second one. The payoffs corresponding to mixed strategies are obtained by adding the winnings of every couple of moves, each one multiplied by the probability that it will be used. The payoffs of our examples are:
Game 2. p1 = 5 α1 β2 + 2 α2 β1 + α2 β2 (2) p2 = 2 α1 β1 + 2 α2 β2
In general: p1 = α1 β1 a11 + α1 β2 a12+ α2 β1 a21 + α2 β2 a22 (4) p2 = α1 β1 b11 + α1 β2 b12 + α2 β1 b21+ α2 β2 b22
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Consider game 3. Notice that for every couple of moves the win of every player is the opposite of the other's win. This affects the relative payoffs (see formula (3)). Every game with this feature is called zero-sum game. The zero-sum games are usually represented by a matrix with the first player's winnings only, implying the others, as in table 5 (where it means that bih= -aih for all i from 1 to m and h from 1 to n). Table 5 : the matrix of zero-sum games Every two person game is called constant-sum game if, for every couple of moves adopted by the players, the sum of the payments is a fix number k. The zero-sum games are a particular case of constant-sum games where k=0.
A solution of a game is a set of mixed strategies adopted by all the players, strategies that have particular properties. Among the principal concepts of solution there are the Nash equilibria, the competitive and the cooperative solutions.
Nash Equilibria
The Nash equilibrium [17] Formally we say that, among the pure strategies of the first player, the i-th weakly dominates the k-th if ai1 ≥ ak1 and ai2 ≥ ak2 where at least one inequality is strong. Similarly, among the pure strategies of the second player, the i-th weakly dominates the k-th if b1i ≥ b1k and b2i ≥ b2k where at least one inequality is strong. Returning to game 1, if we exclude the weakly dominated strategies of A and B we find only a couple of strategies, that correspond to the couple of moves (A2, B2). Remembering that this couple constitutes also a Nash equilibrium, we can realize that it is a good solution from the competitive point of view. Subsequently we will speak about it. On the contrary for what concern games 2 and 3, none of the pure strategies of the first player weakly dominate the other, analogously for the second player.
Now we start considering the zero-sum and the constant-sum games, then we consider the variable-sum games. We report in tables 1a, 2a and 3a the tables 1, 2 and 3 with an amplification that will help us to explain the next arguments (the third in format of zero-sum game). Consider game 3. If player A uses A1, he can win 1 (if player B uses B1) or -2 (if the other uses B2). The worst that can happen to the first player is to win -2. With a similar reasoning, if player A uses A2, the worst that can happen is to win 0. Therefore the move A2 assures, whatever the other plays, to win not less than 0. The move A2 maximizes the minimum result that A can gain, whatever B plays.
Here the point of view of B. For him the wins are with a sign "-". If B uses B1, then his possibile minimum win (the maximum of the first column, with the sign changed) is -1. The same if he uses B2. So for him both moves minimize the maximum of each column. However, he can think: "I know that player A will use his move A2. So it'd better use B1, winning 0". Player A, carrying on the reasoning of B, thinks that it is better for him to use A1, winning 1... and the mechanism "I know that he knows that I know..." goes on entering into a loop. Now let's consider game in table 6 (this time we make an exception with a game with three moves for each player). Table 6 : saddle point in pure strategies
If we reason in the same way as above, we see that the move of maxmin for A is A1 and one of maxmin for B is B2. This time none of the players has interest in changing his move, even if considering the other's move. The reason is that both aim at maxmin point (win 2 for A and -2 for B). On the contrary, in the previous game, the move of maxmin for A brought to 0 and each one of minmax for B brought to 1, originated the loop. In the game in table 6 the couple of moves (A1, B2) makes up a so-called saddle point, as is, jointly, of minimum for the row of A and of maximum for the column of B. This couple of moves is the game's solution, that is to say that it maximizes the minimum win of each player and if one of the two players uses this, the other doesn't have to change his. So there is a Nash equilibrium.
As we have seen, the game in table 6 has a saddle point in pure strategies, while game 3 doesn't. For this second kind of game we have to define if, for the considered application, it does make sense to use mixed strategies or not. If it doesn't make sense, then the prudential solution, is using the moves illustrated above, stopped prudentially at first step, not to risk worsening the payment of maxmin of each player. These moves don't create an equilibrium, but a simple prudential behaviour. We will call them maxmin moves. If, on the contrary, the use of mixed strategies makes sense (for example if the "morra" can be repeated), then the solution is a little bit more complicated to calculate. Nash competitive solution of a zero-sum game is actually a work of John von Neumann [23] ; Nash intervened only afterwards to generalize it for variable sum games. This solution is made of the couple of strategies (α, β) which assure to each player an expected highest winning, no matter which strategies the other player adopts. Therefore it is a saddle point and, also, a Nash equilibrium (even if this concept wasn't born yet in 1928). Von Neumann proved the existence of this solution for all the two-person zero-sum games where each player is provided with any number of moves. We indicate 1 N v and 2 N v the payoffs corresponding to this solution. The pursuit of the solution demands in general an algorithm of linear programming. In the cases considered in this paper solution formulas will be done. Now we can illustrate the procedure.
If there are weakly dominated moves, these moves have to be eliminated and we arrive immediately to the solution. Otherwise we go on as follows. Having called DA = a12 + a21 -(a11 + a22) and α' = (a21 -a22) / DA it is:
Having called β' = (a12 -a22) / DA it is:
In case of game 3:
The corresponding payoffs are:
The maxmin moves can lead to (1, -1), but in this case the possibility to use mixed strategies gives an advantage to the second player. It is easy to prove that every two-person constant-sum game is strategically equivalent to the corresponding zero-sum game achieved removing k/2 to every win. Therefore in constant-sum games the Maxmin solution coincides with the Maxmin solution of corresponding zero-sum game. Of course, the payoffs change, increasing by k/2.
We consider now game 2 as in table 2a. With the same considerations as for game 3, the move of maxmin for A is A2, while both the moves B1 and B2 are of maxmin for B. The same loop "I know that he knows..." of section 3.1 can be started. If mixed strategies make no sense, the solution is composed of maxmin moves illustrated in section 3.1. Otherwise, we look for Nash competitive solution in mixed strategies, which leads to a maxmin expected payoffs. Its adoption assures to any player that his worst expected win be the highest possible, no matter how the other plays.
It is important to know that in variable-sum games the von Neumann's minimax theorem does not apply, as the saddle points of the two matrices of payoffs (referred to each player, respectively) are independent from one another. Therefore there may be couples of maxmin moves directed to the same couple of payments, without being a saddle point. Then, the following general procedure shall always be applied. The Nash competitive solution in mixed strategies can be achieved optimizing a problem of linear programming. We will only describe the resolute method applicable when each player has only two moves.
If there are weakly dominated moves, these moves are going to be eliminated and we obtain immediately the solution. Otherwise we proceed as follows.
Having called DA = a12 + a21 -(a11 + a22) and α' = (a21 -a22) / DA it is:
the maxmin move of , otherwise
Now let us see the search for solutions. 
Game 3
The solution has already been found in the previous section, because the procedure there indicated is the same as the one in this section, adapted to the particular case of zero-sum games. Therefore α = (¼, ¾), β = (¾, ¼) from which N v = (¾, -¾). We are going to present the solution in its general case; then we deduce ones for particular case of zero-sum and of constant-sum games. The Threat competitive solution is an alternative concept of competitive solution. It was proposed by John Nash as a base for a particular cooperative solution: the Nash Threat solution [19] . The model of bargaining on which the Threat competitive solution is based consists in forced cooperation. Each player undertakes, if the cooperation does not occur, to use a competitive strategy such as to damage the other, maximizing the difference between his winning and the other's. Basically, none worries about his own winning, but to threat the other to persuade him to collaborate. The competitive strategies, relating to this threat, are fixed creating the bi-matrix of the differences as reported in table 7. As we can easily see it's a zero-sum game. Therefore tables 1b, 2b and 3b report the game difference of our three games, in zero-sum games format. The payments of difference matrix of every zero-sum game are double compared to those of the native matrix, so we obtain the same Nash competitive solution.
In such games Threat competitive solution coincides with Nash competitive solution. 
Cooperative solutions
In general cooperation gives better results than competition. The problem is the division of the winning among the players; that is when cooperative solutions take place. The main cooperative solutions for two-person games in strategic form are: Nash cooperative (or bargaining) solution [16] and Threat cooperative solution [19] . The opportunity to use one or the other depends on the application context that is being represented: as we have seen, the second one is based on a forced cooperation; the first one instead is the result of a bargaining closer to the immediate interests of each player. We will use figures 1, 2 and 3 to illustrate the three games here examined. The set of payoffs of the game consists in all the reachable payoffs by both players with the use of mixed strategies. It is necessary to distinguish two cases: if the game is a transferable utility (TU) or a not transferable utility (NTU). In case of NTU the payoffs of the players are the couples of values p1 and p2 produced by (4). In particular: Game 1. In this game the set of payoffs is a pseudo right-angled triangle generated by (1) (see dark zone of figure 1 ). It has vertices (0,0), (0,1) and (1,0) and it is bounded at North-East by a pseudo-hypotenuse. The equation of such a line is not important in this context because, as we will see, cooperative solutions are lacking. For the most curious we furnish it however. It is the union between: -the segment of extreme (0, 1) and H = (H1, H2) = (2/15, 2/3), -the segment of extreme (1, 0) It is possible to show that no point above such line is produced by (1) Game 2. In this game the set of payoffs is the zone produced by (2) (see dark zone of figure 2). We omit, for simplicity, the equations of two delimiting curves. In general, the boundary segments of the set of payoffs are obtained tracing in the sketch all the segments that have the points that are on the same lines of the bimatrix of the game as extreme; and all the segments that have as extreme the points that are on the same columns of the bimatrix. Of the above segments, those of the boundary are those belonging to straight lines that don't cross other segments. For instance in game 1 the segments of boundary correspond to the first row and the first column to the bimatrix; in game 2 the segments of boundary correspond to the two columns of the related bimatrix.
On the contrary in game 3, as in all the constant sum games, the payoffs are collocated on one segment, inclined by -45° with respect to the axis p1. The method to find the curvilinear frontiers is more complicated. In the case in which the utility is both transferable between the two players, the set of the payoffs extends to all the straight lines tilted by -45° with respect to the axis p1, passing by any point produced by the (4). In fact the two players can compensate between them the payments situated on such straight lines. We call Pareto optimal point every point of the set of payoffs which can not jointly be improved for both the players, in the sense that if that point is moved to increase the payment of a player, then the payment of the other necessarily decreases.
We can notice that no point inside the set of payments is an optimal Pareto, because at least another best point for both players exists, in the North-East zone of the internal point considered. Then every Pareto optimal point is a boundary point; 
Nash cooperative solution
The Nash cooperative solution consists of the couple of strategies (α, β) that lead to these payoffs (p1, p2) that maximize the function
v ) of payoffs corresponding to Nash cooperative solution is the point of tangency between Pareto optimal boundary and the sheaf of equilateral hyperbolas related to axes originated in − . In not transferable utility games, Nash cooperative solution may not exist (see above). In the case in which it exists, one can get it as follows. First it is necessary to determine the equation of the Pareto optimal segment of tangency. We indicate with u = (u1, u2) ("up") and d = (d1, d2) ("down") the extremes of this segment. Within these extremes, the points (p1, p2) of the segment are defined by the equation:
Then it is necessary to determine the equation of the sheaf of equilateral hyperbolas referred to v = ( v 1, v 2) . The equation of such a sheaf is (p1 -v 1) (p2 -v 2) = k according to the variation of the real parameter k. From the system of the above two equations we deduce a second-degree equation:
In order to have tangency, this equation must have only a solution. Therefore, without proceeding in useless calculations, we simply set p2 = -b/2a. Then, we draw p1 from the precedent system and we obtain the point of tangency (p1, p2). Now we make a last operation. It can happen (not in our examples) that the point of tangency so calculated is really on the straight line, but out of the segment having u and d as extremal points. In this case the solution is the extreme point of the segment, on the side of the tangency. In other words, once is calculated the point (p1, p2) we set:
The strategies α and β that bring to (v1, v2) can be obtained from (0) and (4) replacing the values (v1, v2) now found, instead of the payoffs (p1, p2) reported in (4). Now we give the following example. Game 1 (see figure 1) . In case of NTU the feasible set is the pseudo-triangle of vertices (0, 0), (0. 1) and (1, 0). Its pseudo-hypotenuse creates the Pareto optimal boundary. This boundary is different from Pareto optimal boundary of the convex hull of the pseudo-triangle (i.e. the hypotenuse). Then there isn't Nash cooperative solution. Since 1 ≤ p1 ≤ 5, the point is on the segment with extremes u and d. It follows v N = (7/3, 4/3). The strategies corresponding to v, that constitute the Nash cooperative solution, can be deduced from (0) and (2) setting p1= 7/3 and p2= 4/3. Therefore if
after some algebra we get β 1(12 β 1-7) = 0 and α1 = 2 β 1+ 1/3 . Having rejected solution β 1= 7/12 (because it implies α1>1) there is only β 1= 0, that leads to α1 =1/3. In conclusion, the Nash cooperative solution consists in strategies α= (1/3, 2/3) and β = (0, 1). As we see, they bring to the vector of payoffs v N = (7/3, 4/3) = (2. 3 ̅ , 1. 3 ̅ ). All the transferable utility games have cooperative solution. Players are able in fact to use strategies to maximize the sum of their payments transferring then the utility from one to the other in order to reach the solution. Let H be the maximum value of the sum p1 + p2 so reachable. We now have to find the point of tangency among the straight line p2 = -p1 + H and the sheaf of equilateral hyperbolas related to
). Now we illustrate the following examples. Game 1. In case of TU, the maximum total win is H=1, obtainable from the strategies for which a player intervenes and the other does not intervene. The feasible set is the complete triangle. Its hypotenuse constitutes the Pareto optimal boundary. Remembering that the Nash competitive solution is 1 
Main results. Pareto optimal condition
The existence and uniqueness of this solution has been proved for many cases, for instance if the payoffs is a convex set. In general, if the Pareto optimal boundary of the convex hull (coX) of the feasible set coincides with the Pareto optimal boundary of the last set, then the solution is unique; elsewhere the solution does not exist. Proof. We must consider two cases: 1.
If Pareto optimal boundary of coX of the individually rational feasible set coincides with the Pareto optimal boundary of X (we imagine the graph of both sets and we can see as the only part that can make them different is the part where there is the Pareto optimal boundary, while the other sides of the "polygon" are equal for both (they are delimited by payoff of disagreement)) then X=coX and then X is convex. Figure 2 
2.
If Pareto optimal boundary of coX of the individually rational feasible set does not coincide with the Pareto optimal boundary of X. In this case the coX of set X has to contain all the points of set X and then if two Pareto optimal boundaries do not coincide there is least one point in coX. Since coX of a convex set is equal to the same set and since the coX does not coincide with X, then the set X is not convex. On the other side of the relationship X is convex, then "Pareto optimal boundary of coX of the individually rational feasible set coincides with Pareto optimal boundary of X. If X is convex, X=coX and then also their boundaries coincide. If X is not convex, then X and its coX do not coincide.
Conclusion
We recapitulate in tables 1c, 2c and 3c the solutions and the related payoffs of our examples. It is easy to prove that for the constant-sum games (and particularly for the zerosum games) the cooperative solutions coincide with the competitive. In fact in these games the Pareto optimal boundary coincides with the feasible set. Game 3. We deduce v T = (3/4, -3/4). Moreover we show that in order that their Pareto optimal boundaries coincide it is necessary that there isn't a point belonging to coX that is payoff Pareto optimal, but that does not belong to X. This could be if only X and its coX coincide, but this is not true for assumptions. Then there exists a payoff Pareto optimal belonging to coX, but not in X. Then two Pareto optimal boundaries do not coincide, and then the solution does not exist.
SOLUTIONS
